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(Dated:)
We propose the improved decoy state quantum key distribution incorporating finite statistics due to the finite
code length and report on its demonstration. In our experiment, four different intensities including the vacuum
state for optimal pulses are used and the key generation rate of 200 bps is achieved in the 20 km telecom optical
fiber transmission keeping the eavesdropper’s mutual information with the final key less than 2−9.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 03.67.-a
Quantum key distribution (QKD) was originally proposed
by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [1] as a protocol, by which
two parties, Alice and Bob, share secret keys by using a quan-
tum communication channel as well as a public classical chan-
nel [2]. A remarkable feature is its unconditional security
[3]; it is guaranteed by the fundamental laws of quantum me-
chanics and thereby QKD provides the unconditionally se-
cure communication system. In the practical setting of op-
tical communication, however, it is the almost only option
to substitute qubits in the original BB84 QKD protocol with
heavily attenuated laser pulses because the perfect single pho-
ton emitting devices are not available in the current technol-
ogy. Such laser pulses - the phase randomized weak coherent
states - contain inevitably the multiphoton states at small but
finite probability, which give a malicious eavesdropper (Eve)
a chance to obtain some amount of information on the shared
keys by a photon-number-splitting attack [4]. Gottesman-Lo-
Lu¨tkenhaus-Preskill (GLLP) showed, however, that it is still
possible to obtain unconditionally secret key by BB84 proto-
col with such imperfect light sources, although the key gener-
ation rate and distances are very limited [5].
The recently proposed decoy state method [6, 7, 8, 9] is
one of the promising practical solutions to BB84 QKD with
coherent state light pulses, in which several coherent state
light pulses with different intensities are used. Such optical
pulses with different intensities have different photon num-
ber statistics. This simple fact equips Alice and Bob with a
countermeasure against Eve. The original idea of the decoy
state QKD is due to Hwang [6]. So far, several experimen-
tal demonstrations of decoy state QKD have been reported
[10, 11, 12, 13, 14]. In most cases, the security analysis is
based on the GLLP’s asymptotic arguments, whereas, in the
practical setting, the code length is finite so that the asymp-
totic argument is no longer valid and the unconditional secu-
rity is actually not guaranteed any more. The security analysis
of QKD with the finite code size must incorporate the statis-
tical fluctuations of the observed quantities [15]. Although
several authors [7, 9, 11, 16] have considered the influence
of statistical fluctuations on the decoy state QKD with finite
code length, what all of them have done is limited to the re-
adjustment of parameters of the asymptotic GLLP’s formula
for the secure key generation rate. Such an ad hoc treatment
cannot be justified to claim the unconditional security.
In this paper, we propose a substantially improved decoy
state QKD in the framework of finite coding length [17] and
report on its experimental results. In our experiment, we
employ the decoy state method with three decoy pulses and
demonstrate that in the 20 km optical fiber transmission, the
final key was successfully generated at the rate 200 bps keep-
ing the eavesdropper’s mutual information with the final key
less than 2−9.
In our protocol, we use k + 1 different intensities or mean
photon numbers µ0 = 0 < µ1 < . . . < µk including vacuum
(µ0) for the optical pulses. Two conjugate bases (+ and ×) are
treated separately so that 2k+1 different pulses are involved in
total. The vacuum state (i = 0) is sent at the probability p0 and
the µi pulse with × (+) basis is sent at the probability pi (pi+k)
(i = 1, . . . , k) The pulse with intensity µi0 (µi0+k) (the signal
pulse) is used to distill the final secret key and the remainings
(decoy pulses) are used just for estimation of Eve’s attacks
and/or the noise characteristics of quantum channel.
The code length (size of raw key) is denoted by N and the
time slot to generate a final secure key is denoted by T . We
also fix the maximum number N of the size of final key. Our
2protocol is as follows. Within the time slot T , Alice randomly
sends Bob a sequence of optical pulses of k+1 different inten-
sities with randomly chosen basis. After that, Bob performs
a measurement in one of the two bases and Alice and Bob
compare bases and keep the pulses with a common basis by
communicating via public channel. The number of sending
pulses, received pulses, and pulses of a common basis are de-
noted by, respectively, Ai, Ci, and Ei (i = 0, . . . , 2k). The
Ei bit string of ith pulse contains error bits, which will be
detected by checking a portion of the bits (check bits). To
prepare check bits, Alice and Bob firstly perform the random
permutation on Ei0 and Ei0+k bit strings by sharing common
random numbers via public channel. Then, for i = i0 and
i = i0 + k, the first N bit string is used as the raw key and
the remaining Ei0 − N and Ei0+k − N bit string are used as
the check bits, while the whole Ei bits are used as check bits
for i , i0, i0 + k. (If Ei0 ≤ N or Ei0+k ≤ N, then the proto-
col is aborted.) The number of detected errors of ith pulse is
denoted by Hi (i = 1, . . . , 2k). From these quantities, Alice
and Bob can evaluate the size of the final key guaranteeing
the unconditional security. If the evaluated final key size is
not positive, the protocol is aborted again. The final secret
key N f inal is computed as Nη
(
Hi0+k/(Ei0+k − N)
) − mmax for
+ basis and ˜N f inal is computed as Nη
(
Hi0/(Ei0 − N)
) − m˜max
for × basis, where η(·) denotes the error correcting coding rate
and mmax (m˜max) represents the size of privacy amplification.
If N < N f inal (N < ˜N f inal), they replace N f inal ( ˜N f inal) by N.
The error correction (or reverse reconciliation in our pro-
tocol) is performed as follows. Suppose that Alice and Bob
have, respectively, the random number sequences X and X′ of
n bits, which contain some errors. The task is to distill the
common random number sequence of l bits with negligible
errors. Let G be the generator matrix of [n, l] classical error
correcting code. Bob generates the random number sequence
Z ∈ {0, 1}l and sends the bit string GZ+X′ to Alice. Then
Alice decodes GZ+X′ − X to extract Z. For the classical er-
ror correcting code, Low Density Parity Check (LDPC) code
[18] is used. The advantage of LDPC code is that the decoding
with O(n) operations is possible by using Sum-Product decod-
ing method [18], where n is the coding length. Furthermore,
the coding rate achieves the Shannon limit asymptotically. In
the privacy amplification, we use the universal2 hash function.
More specifically, we use (l − m) × l Toeplitz matrix Mp [19]
to subtract m bit information from the original information of
l bits.
Now, let us describe the Eve’s possible attacks. To this end,
we firstly define multiphoton states ρl (l = 2, . . . , k + 1) as
ρl = Ω
−1
i
∑∞
n=i
γl,n
n! |n〉 〈n| with
γl,n =
l−1∑
j=1
(µl−1 − µl−2) · · · (µl−1 − µ1)µ2l−1µn−2j
(µ j − µl−1) · · · (µ j − µ j+1)(µ j − µ j−1) · · · (µ j − µ1) ,
Ωl being the normalization constant and µ1 < µ2 < . . . < µk.
The phase-randomized coherent state, e−µi ∑∞n=0 µnin! |n〉 〈n| can
be expressed as a convex combination of |0〉 〈0|, |1〉 〈1|, and ρi.
Here, we adopt the worst case scenario. Namely, we assume
that Eve can distinguish vacuum state ( j = 0), single pho-
ton state ( j = 1), multiphton states ρ2, . . . , ρk+1 with × basis
( j = 2, . . . , k+1) and those with + basis ( j = k+2, . . . , 2k+1).
The number of jth state ( j = 0, . . . , 2k + 1) is denoted by B j.
According to the values of B j, Eve can do the following at-
tacks; She tricks Bob into detecting the jth state with prob-
ability q j and causes phase errors with probability r j for the
jth state ( j = 1, 2, . . . , k + 1) and bit errors with probability r˜ j
for the jth state ( j = 1, k + 2, . . . , 2k + 1). In the following,
we focus on the + basis case. The detection ratio pi = Ci/Ai
(i = 0, . . . , 2k) is written in terms of q j as
pi =
2k+1∑
j=0
P ji q
j + pD, (1)
where pD is the detector dark count rate and P ji is the gen-
eration probability of the jth state given that the ith pulse is
emitted. The error probability si = Hi/Ei (i , i0, 1 ≤ i ≤ k)
and si0 = Hi0/(Ei0 − N) satisfies [20]
si pi =
k+1∑
j=1
P ji q
jr j +
1
2
(P0i q0 + pD). (2)
In our decoy state method, Alice and Bob try to estimate pa-
rameters q j and r j (˜r j) from the observed quantities C, E, and
H to the best of their ability. The complete determination is,
however, beyond their ability so they put the safety standards
most stringent. The computed size of privacy amplification is
thus given by
mmax = max
0≤x≤
√
2(1−pD),0≤y≤1
m(x, y), (3)
where
m(x, y)
= m∞ −
Nq1(x)
[
h(r1(x, y)) − 1
]
Ci0+k
√
Ai0+kP1i0+k(1 − P1i0+k)
×
[
−Φ−1(2−δ1 )
]
+
√
vx,y,i0(qML(x, y), rML(x, y))
[
−Φ−1(2−δ2)
]
+ δ3 (4)
with δ1(2,3) being security parameters. Here,
Φ(x) = 1√
2pi
∫ x
−∞
e−
x2
2 dx
and
h(x) =
{
1 if 1/2 < x ≤ 1,
−x log2 x − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) if 0 ≤ x ≤ 1/2.
In Eq. (4), x = (qk+1 + q2k+1)/√2 and y = rk+1; q1(x) and
r1(x, y) are direct solutions of Eqs. (1) and (2) as a function
of x and y, while qML(x, y) and rML(x, y) are values of max-
imal likelihood estimation. Furthermore, m∞ and vx,y,i0 are,
respectively, the mean and variance of the stochastic variable
3F1i0+k
[
ha
(
G1i0+k/F
1
i0+k
)
− 1
]
+ N − F−1i0+k, where G
j
i = r
jF ji +
∆
′G ji , F
j
i0 =
Ei0−N
Ei0
E ji0 + ∆
′ F ji0 and F
j
i0+k =
N
Ei0+k
E ji0+k + ∆
′ F ji0+k
with E ji =
1
2C
j
i + ∆
′ E ji , and C
j
i = q
jB ji + ∆
′C ji (C−1i =
pDAi + ∆
′C−1i ). These stochastic variables as well as Hi obey
the respective hypergeometric distributions, which are fully
incorporated in the computation of vx,y,i0 .
Now, let us go back to Eq. (3). To ensure that the leakage
information is less than 2−δ, it is sufficient to choose δ1 =
δ + ⌈log2 N⌉ + 1 and δ2 = δ3 = δ + ⌈log2 N⌉ + 2. The detail
will be published elsewhere [21].
Experiment.— The key generation experiment was done
with a 20 km-long optical fiber in a common office envi-
ronment. The setup, working on the 62.5 MHz clock, was
based on the ”plug-and-play” QKD system used in the 14-
days-continuous quantum key distribution experiment [22].
The wavelength of the light was 1.55 µm. The intensity of
the optical pulses were randomly chosen with a dual-drive
Lithium Niobate Mach-Zehnder intensity modulator [23]. The
modulator provides phase shifts simultaneously to define the
four BB84 states, as the output wave is given by Eout =
Eint cos[(φ1−φ2)/2] exp[i(φ1+φ2)/2], where φ1 and φ2 are the
phase shifts in the two arms of Mach-Zehnder interferometer.
We employed ”alternative-shifted-phase-modulation” to use a
polarization dependent device [24]. A PC with Pentium(R)4
(3GHz) CPU and 2 GB memory was connected to the QKD
apparatus to perform the error correction and privacy ampli-
fication. The random numbers used in the experiment were
generated by a physical random number generation hardware.
Before running the protocol, the detector dark count rate
pD must be determined in advance, which was measured as
3.00 × 10−4 per pulse. We used pulses with three different fi-
nite intensities µ1, µ2, and µ3 in addition to the vacuum state
(k = 3) because at least four different intensities including
vacuum are needed to achieve the almost optimal secure key
generation rate asymptotically [25]. The final key was dis-
tilled from the µ3 pulses sequence. We set µ3 = 0.5. This is
due to the observation that at the limit µ1, µ2 → 0, the choice
of µc = 0.5 yields the best final key generation rate asymptot-
ically [25]. The others are set to be µ1 = 0.07 and µ2 = 0.35,
which are the smallest two values available in our system. The
security parameters were set to be δ = 9 so that Eve’s mutual
information with the final key is guaranteed to be less than
2−9 [21].
The size of LDPC code was 1.0 × 104. The Sum-Product
method is an approximate decoding one so that there is a finite
probability of decoding without converging. In our case, the
unconverging probability was about 3 × 10−3. If the decoding
is unsuccessful, the bit string must be discarded, but after the
successful decoding, the bit error rate was reduced to as small
as 1.0 × 10−10. The coding length N was set to be 10 times
of the LDPC coding length 1.0 × 104 (N = 1.0 × 105) and the
error correction was performed on each 104 bit block of N.
We performed the above-described QKD experiment for 40
rounds. The sum of the key generation rate of + and × bases
is shown in Fig 1. We set the time slot T = 41.8 sec and
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FIG. 1: Sum of key generation rates of + and × bases. Error rates
were the average of two bases.
TABLE I: Number of received bits and check bits.
Received Bits Check Bits
Intensity + basis × basis + basis × basis
Vacuum 52399
0.07 172935 173779 88406 84430
0.35 177279 178666 89967 87700
0.50 784750 786163 294847 292321
A0 : A1(= A4) : A2(= A5) : A3(= A6) = 0.125 : 0.1875 :
0.0625 : 0.1875. We also fix N = 212 which maximizes the
average of the key generation rates. The number of received
pulses Ci and the check bits for the coding length N = 1.0×105
are listed in Table I. When the error rate on + (×) basis was
5.2% (6.1%), the final secret key of 8.2×103 bit was generated
and the generation rate was around 200 bps. In this case the
raw key of N = 1.0×105 bit was reduced to the size of 5.6×104
bit by error correction and further to the size of 4.1 × 103 bit
by privacy amplification on each basis. If the error rates were
more than 6.5%, then few final secret key was left. Although
the key generation rates obtained in our experiments are not
so large, the most important point is that the final keys are
guaranteed to be unconditionally secure in our decoy method
while previously reported ones [10, 11, 12, 13, 14] are not.
The small values of the key generation rates are due to the
statistical fluctuations of observed quantities which are never
negligible even if the code length is 1.0 × 105.
Discussion on experimental parameters.— Many adjustable
parameters are involved in our protocol and some of them are
in the trade-off relation. In the following, we clarify, albeit
qualitatively, the dependence of these parameters on our de-
coy state QKD experiment for further improvements.
Firstly, the sending probability of the signal pulse must be
large enough to ensure E3, E6 ≥ N. We also performed the
same experiment but under the condition A0 : A1(= A4) :
A2(= A5) : A3(= A6) = 0.125 : 0.125 : 0.125 : 0.125 and the
resulting generation rate of the secret key was around 50 bps,
which is less than that of Fig 1. However, the sending prob-
ability of pulses with intensities µ1 and µ2 also must not be
4too small. Otherwise, the statistical error of estimating Eve’s
parameters would become large reducing the size of final key.
After all, our choice of sending probabilities that check bits
for the intensity 0.07 are as much as those for the intensity
0.35 in Table I is quite favorable, although it is not optimized.
Secondly, the processing time of each step in our proto-
col affects directly the key generation rate. The most time-
consuming process is the sharing of common random numbers
via quantum channel. It took around 42 sec in the experiment
to obtain the results of Fig 1. The second one is the compu-
tation of the size of privacy amplification, which requires the
nested numerical optimization and took around 10 sec. The
generation of physical random numbers also took around 10
sec, but they did not degrade the total performance since they
were performed in a parallel manner. The random permuta-
tion, error correction, and privacy amplification were the least
time-consuming processes; they took only a few seconds.
Thirdly, the length of the time slot T is also one of the
adjustable parameters. The numbers of received pulses Ci,
pulses with a common basis, and the check bits are propor-
tional to T . When these numbers are too small the contribu-
tion of statistical fluctuation of the right-hand side of Eq. (4)
becomes large reducing the size of the final secret key. Thus,
T must be large enough. However, too large T merely re-
sults in low key generation rate since the parameter estima-
tion is not improved any longer for sufficiently large value of
T . Thus, we can expect there is some optimal value of T .
Under the same conditions of our experiment, the largest key
generation rate is expected to be achieved when the smallest
size of check bits (for the intensity 0.07 in Fig 1) is around
85% of the coding length N = 1.0 × 105.
Finally, let us briefly discuss the size of random numbers
used in our experiment. The random numbers, which are
all physical random numbers, are used for random permu-
tation, error correction, and the generation of Toeplitz ma-
trix. Among them, the random permutation is most demand-
ing; it requires the random numbers of the size O(N log N) ≃
1.7×106 bits since each bit in E3 (E6) is randomly exchanged.
The overall performance of decoy state QKD could be im-
proved if we used the unidirectional QKD system [26, 27]
instead of ’plug-and-play’ system here. By doing so, a larger
bit string of common random numbers would be available so
that the better performance of error correction and therefore
higher secret key distillation rate would be expected. In our
experiment, the bottleneck of the key generation time is the
common random number sharing via quantum channel. This
would be resolved if the transmission rate of optical pulses
was improved, however, the computational time of the size of
privacy amplification would emerge as the second difficulty.
The time of random number sharing via quantum channel is
proportional to the coding length N, while the time of gener-
ating physical random numbers is proportional to O(N log N).
Therefore, if N is too large, the generation of random numbers
may affect seriously the total performance.
In summary, we have proposed and demonstrated the im-
proved decoy state QKD incorporating finite statistics due to
the finite code length. We employed the decoy state method
with four different intensities including vacuum state for op-
tical pulses and achieved the final key generation rate of 200
bps in 20 km telecom optical fiber transmission keeping the
eavesdropper’s mutual information with the final key as small
as 2−9. We also discussed the dependence of several parame-
ters on our QKD experiment.
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